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II. BUDDHISM

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798 This oldest of imported religions shows, in its recent development, some of the trends just noted. Despite the efforts of the noted abbot Tai Hsü (1889-1946), Buddhism never competed successfully for the allegiance of the intellectuals. The effort to transform it into a modern religion, by updating both its doctrine and its social program, failed, although for a time it seemed to show signs of an increasing vitality. Under warlord and Nationalist governments its personnel and establishments suffered severe attrition. Its establishments were taxed, its temples were converted to secular use by warlords, Kuomintang officials, and the local gentry. Much Buddhist property was confiscated, and tenants on Buddhist land refused to pay their rent. Monks and nuns were driven from their temples in the cities where up to 80 per cent of Buddhist establishments were converted to use as schools, barracks, and police stations.[5]

5. Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China, New York, 1953, pp. 55-56. This summary is from Ta-hsing, "Fifteen Years of Religious Catastrophes in Retrospect," Hai-ch'ao-yin magazine, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Jan. 1935.

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• 779 The Japanese attempt to use Buddhism as an ideology to bind together their puppet regimes in China and Southeast Asia generated wide-spread anti-Buddhist sentiment throughout Free and Occupied China.

779 792 The older clergy of monks and nuns was accused of being corrupt and parastic by modern Buddhists, but efforts at sweeping fundamental reform failed; the motivation for becoming a member of such a clergy remained largely negative.[6] Thus gradual extinction of

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6. Chan, Religious Trends, pp. 81-82, citing Reichelt, Truth and Tradition in Chinese Buddhism, pp. 231-34, lists reasons given by Chinese nuns for entering holy orders. Unhappy marriages account for a great number, and 60 to 70 per cent made the choice because no other solution presented itself. Other reasons for entering holy orders include: genuine and deep faith; presented to the church by parents because of devotion, sickness, lack of support, or an astrologer's advice; sense of helplessness after husband's death; poverty, family troubles or other disappointments; influence of sisters, et al, who had become nuns; and servants seeking escape from the cruelty of their mistresses.

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the Buddhist order seemed only a matter of time. But as late as 1930, the Buddhist clergy and establishments in Southwest China were numerous, especially in the rich and populous province of Szechwan.[7]

Provinces	Buddhist Clergy	Temples, Monasteries and Nunneries
Szechwan	158,610	39,089
Yunnan	37,180	9,920
Kweichow	720	410

It is not possible to trace the decline from 1930 onward, but the pressures of war and invasion added to those noted above probably contributed to a sharp reduction of boty clergy and establishments in this area. Communist measures have probably eliminated most of what remained. Buddhist establishments in China as a whole appear to have declined in number from 268,494 in 1930[8] to about 130,000 in 1947[9] to "less than 100" in 1954.[10]

7. Shen-pao Nien-chien [Shen-pao Yearbook], 1933, p. T2.

8. Ibid., Basis of figures is data collected by the China Buddhist Association.

9. [see following page]

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779 Estimates on the total number[11] of clergy vary,
792 but in 1931 they appear to have numbered 500,000 to 600,000. Refugees in 1949-50 reported that four out of every seven clerics had been forced to return to lay life.[12] By 1954 it was estimated that there were only 2,500 clergy remaining in the whole of China, "of which half are Chinese Communist Party agents."[13] Even allowing for exaggeration, it would appear that the Buddhist clergy as a group has been nearly eliminated and that its dwindling influence in society has reached the vanishing point.

779 While the traditional clergy was in decline, Buddhist laymen assisted by a few monks attempted the reinvigoration of the Chinese Buddhist community. The leadership of the movement

9. Communist Atrocities and Persecutions of Buddhism on the China Mainland, (a four-page pamphlet), Buddhist Association of China, Taiwan, 1954; hereinafter cited as Atrocities.
10. Ibid.
11. Chan, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
12. Chan, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
13. Atrocities.

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779 was largely from the East China Region. In the Southwest, Szechwan was an important secondary center. Modern-minded Buddhists felt that a lesson could be learned from Protestantism in the West: that an entrenched clergy could not be the instrument of sweeping reform. Hence their efforts were concentrated on building lay organizations of various kinds: social welfare organizations such as the YMBA and YWBA patterned on the YMCA and YWCA, Buddhist schools and seminaries to train a modern clergy, and research centers for the re-evaluation of the Buddhist heritage. They attempted to reach out and join hands with Buddhists in other Asiatic countries, and good-will tours and conferences were organized. Buddhist writing and publishing were encouraged.[14]

The Chinese Buddhist Association, founded in 1914 to oppose the effort to make Confucianism a state religion, continued as

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14. Chan, op. cit., pp. 1-62, points out that 537 Buddhist works and 58 Buddhist periodicals were published in the years 1920-35 in all parts of China. Most of the periodicals were short-lived.

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779 the main organization of Chinese Buddhists. It claimed 4,620,000 members in 1947, but its organization was loose and weak; it included heterogeneous components: Buddhist philosophers, simple believers, reformist clergy and many of the old clergy, nationalists, internationalists, and Japan-oriented pan-Asians. The great abbot Tai-hsü, master monk-politician, tried to weld these elements into a strong, effective, and enduring organization which could formulate an attractive, long-range program and defend Buddhism against attack. But he ultimately failed, and the Buddhists of China had not the means to defend themselves against Kuomintang pressure; when the Communists came, the Buddhists had a stronger adversary and neither the means nor the spirit to resist. Some residue of the modern Buddhist movement may be found in the Southwest, perhaps only in Szechwan. The following is a breakdown, by provinces, of the number of Buddhist believers claimed in 1930 by the China Buddhist Association. The second column gives the number of modern type Buddhist organizations such as schools, translation and publication societies, missionary societies, etc.[15]

15. Shen-pao Yearbook, 1933, p. T2.

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Province	Lay Adherents	Modern Organizations
Szechwan	490,700	190
Yunnan	36,130	1
Kweichow	2,730	17

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668 Such Buddhist schools and institutes as had survived have been taken over by the Communists. Buddhist periodicals have been stopped in Chungking and elsewhere, and publishing houses closed. The Han-Tibetan College in Chungking, along with other Buddhist colleges, has been closed. Two Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines have appeared, one in Peking, one in Shanghai; they are devoted to reconciling Buddhism and Marxism.[16] A new Chinese Buddhist Association was formed in Peking in November 1952, with several leading Buddhist scholars among its leaders.[17] Unlike the earlier Buddhist Association, which was organized by Buddhists to reform and defend

16. Atrocities. According to this report the circulation of Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines is very limited.

17. According to Buddhism in China, Peking, Nationalities Publishing House, 1955, p. 2, the effective date of organization was June 1953, when 93 persons representing "the monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen of different nationalities and Buddhist schools of the various regions" were elected to serve as its board of directors.

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their faith, the new body is sponsored, organized, and manipulated by the state and the Party. In China's relations with the Buddhist countries of Asia, it will be used as a propaganda device to allay their fear that China is an enemy of Buddhism; it will also be used to "soothe" and control Buddhist populations in Mongolia, the former Sikang province, and Tibet.[18] Domestically, the new association, like all others in Communist China, will be used primarily for the indoctrination and control of its members. As early as May 1951, a central committeeman of the Party outlined the chief tasks for Chinese Buddhists: (1) participation in land reform, (2) opposition to counterrevolutionaries, (3) participation in the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and (4) recognition of the duty to construct a new religion in the new society.[19]

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18. The Dalai Lama, the Panchen Ngoerhtehni, the Chagan Kogen of Inner Mongolia, and the Venerable Hsu Yun have been chosen as honorary presidents of the Buddhist Association. Cf., Buddhism in China, p. 20. A photograph in the same volume shows an encampment of Tibetan tribesman in Sikang listening to a lama's sermon. Another shows a Southern Buddhist temple in the Tai Autononous area in Yunnan.

19. Richard Walker, China Under Communism, New Haven, 1955, pp. 188-89.

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779 In the principal cities, especially those visited by delegations from Buddhist countries like Burma and Ceylon, a few temples are maintained for religious use. But the greatest number of temples have been converted for use by the state. One source, admittedly strongly biased, asserts that the number of Peking temples in religious use has fallen from 1,300 to 3, that in Nanking the number has decreased from 400 to 1, in Shanghai from 600 to 2, and in Hangchow from 300 to 1.[20] Certain Buddhist monuments of historical and cultural importance are being restored and preserved.[21]

779 792 As we have pointed out, the clergy has been largely secularized. In Shanghai, as in other cities, monks have opened restaurants specializing in Buddhist dishes. Everywhere the clergy has converted temples into small factories in order to produce hand-made articles. Monks of the Fa-tsang temple in Shanghai now work on

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20. Atrocities.
21. Buddhism in China, introduction and plates.

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nearby farms. In Hangchow, some 1,800 monks and nuns have opened restaurants or are working in mills and on farms; they have established an association in order to co-ordinate their enterprises.[22] We have few details on the fate of the Buddhist clergy in the Southwest.

There are occasional reports of Buddhist ceremonies, such as the celebration of the Buddha's birth day.[23] But the general impression is that Buddhism is dying. The old may cling to their beliefs, but their influence on their children is now slight. Buddhist belief is a handicap to youth who must adopt Marxist orthodoxy in order to succeed under the present regime. The cadres in the countryside are attacking "superstition," and their ridicule of old Buddhist-linked observances is further undermining the faith. The clergy, never up to their task of serving a modern religious community, has turned to other pursuits. There is little in Buddhist doctrine to steel the believer

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22. Chan, op. cit., pp. 90-91. Based on testimony of refugees, 1950.

23. New China News Agency, Peking, May 29, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press, 1058, p. 48; also photograph of the ceremony of "Bathing the Buddha" on May 20, 1953, in Buddhism in China.

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779 to resist totalitarianism or the trend of the 178 times. The willingness of some Buddhist leaders to openly embrace Communist doctrine has probably undermined what little will to resist there may have been.[24]

III. TAOISM

779 Some of the tendencies noted in the modern history of Chinese Buddhism are also to be found in Taoism. But the differences are many, and they spring from fundamental differences between the two religions.

It is convenient for our purposes to consider two levels of Taoism. One is Taoism

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24. The outstanding example is Chü-tsan -- a modern-minded reformist monk with an excellent background in philosophy, religious, and social work -- the latter particularly in Hunan. He was one of two Buddhist delegates (out of 585) to the People's Political Consultative Conference. Chan, op. cit., p. 92, records Chü-tsan's willingness as of 1948 to support a Communist regime. Cf. also, Chü-tsan's article, "A Buddhist Monk's Life," in China Reconstructs, Jan.-Feb. 1954, pp. 42-44.

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• 779 as an organized religion; the other is Taoism as a folk religion at the village level.[25] The Taoist religion developed as a reaction to the challenge of the imported faith of Buddhism. It borrowed extensively from its alien rival; its scriptures, its clerical hierarchy and organization, its rituals, its heavens and hells were often scarcely disguised copies of those of Buddhism. Its decline over the last five-hundred years has been slow but steady; in recent years its decline has accelerated. Some aspects of this should be noted. Intellectual vitality has long since disappeared, and there was little doctrine on which to base a modern revival of the religion. The priesthood, divided between northern and southern sects, was largely locally recruited; there was no central control exercised by the hereditary "Heavenly Teachers" (T'ien-shih) of the two sects, and the monks gained the reputation of being idle and corrupt. If their way of life was hardly inspiring, their practical function no longer involved spiritual leadership but only astrological and magical performances for those of the population who might still believe

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25. The residue of philosophic Taoism is dealt within the chapter on Basic Attitudes in this handbook.

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779 in them.[26] The last "Heavenly Master" of the Southern School was driven from his headquarters in Kiangsi by the Communists in 1927; in 1949 he was again a refugee in Macao and had "decided that it was time for him to buy some books to read."[27] The last abbot of the headquarters of the Northern School, the Po-yün-kuan at Peking, was burned alive by his fellow monks in 1947 when his corruption became too flagrant; the Nationalist Government then confiscated the lands which had long supported the Po-yün-kuan.

Religious Taoism has not had the inspiration or the leadership to develop modern doctrines and programs as Buddhism and Islam have done. There was an abortive effort at a national Taoist association in the years 1912-15,[28] but this was not accompanied by any rallying of believers, nor was it followed by

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26. Chan, op. cit., pp. 146-52.

27. Ibid., p. 152. Another source says that he was "deposed" by Chinese Nationalist troops in 1927. Cf. Ch'en Hung-shun, "The Taoist Press in China" in Rudolf Lowenthal, ed. The Religious Periodical Press in China, Peking, 1940, p. 167.

28. Shina mondai jiten [Encyclopedia of China Problems], Tokyo, 1942, pp. 416-17.

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779 the development of any social, educational, or medical program. (Efforts along these lines proved abortive.) Taoist temples have been steadily secularized, and the Communist will complete this process. The Communists themselves recognize that "Religious Taoism" is dead. In 1949, when bidding for the support of religious groups, they invited representatives of Buddhism, Protestantism, and Islam to the People's Political Consultative Conference but no representative of Taoism.[29]

779 Folk Taoism in the present study includes all of the local cults and practices that have, for millenia, been characteristic of the villages of China. Organized Taoism in many respects, simply magnified and encompassed a wide variety of folk cults, giving this amalgam some of the trappings of an organized "religion." Folk Taoism, like organized Taoism, has been in a long slow decline. The gods of its pantheon have been increasingly neglected; the shrines and temples in the towns and villages have fallen into neglect. The arrival of modern school teachers, the appearance, even occasional, of effective modern doctors have steadily undermined belief in the efficacy of magic, alchemy,

29. Chan, op. cit., p. 146.

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779 and charms. The City God, tutelary deity of an urban center, is no longer enshrined and worshipped; in many villages the god of grain no longer has his altar.[30] One sample survey showed that in the early 1930's, 58 per cent of the folk shrines were no longer being used for their original purpose;[31] the decline in the last twenty-five years has been accelerated. It should be noted that many of the folk cults of Yunnan and Kweichow are of local origin and do not share the common characteristics of the folk Taoism of the old settled provinces.

798 In the case of folk Taoism, and other local cults, the Communists have moved to bring to an end a complex of ancient practices that had long been dying out. Their method has been a campaign against superstition, a campaign carried out with all of the many devices of propaganda and pressure which are described elsewhere in this volume. It may be sufficient here to point out a few typical methods of attack on folk religion. In a rhymed indoctrination text for women we find exhortations to stay

30. Cf., Chan, op. cit., p. 145, for an excellent summary of their development.

31. C.S. Braden, Modern Tendencies in World Religions, New York, 1933, p. 113, as cited in Chan, op. cit., p. 145.

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IV. MOHAMMEDANISM

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563 Islam was introduced into China, not by missionaries but by immigrants arriving overland from the west and northwest and by sea to Canton; they have since spread until there are some in every province, although the highest concentration is in the northwest and southwest. Since their ancestors were immigrants, the Mohammedans have been treated by Chinese governments as both an ethnic minority and a religious group. (Hence, cf. the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Adherents have tended to live in separate communities, their mores and customs governed by religious law rather than by the laws and customs of China. Not only did Islam prescribe for the believer a different way of life from that of the Chinese, it also had international connections and a tradition of militancy. These aspects of Mohammedanism made their communities in China the object of government distrust, and governments in modern times have alternated between policies of suppression and of appeasement.

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41. (continued) p. 3, and JMJP, July 7, 1955, p. 3.

42. The account of the suppression of I-kuan tao and other secret societies in the Kalgan area includes details of their considerable *resourcefulness. Cf. SCMP, No. 1078,* pp. 27-28.

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779 563 The Chinese Mohammedan is set apart from other Chinese by such special customs and observances as these: many greetings are exchanged in Arabic or Persian; believers wear white headdresses resembling turbans; they abstain from alcohol and pork; marriage and funeral rites are different from the Chinese, e.g., they do not use coffins in burial. Traditionally, they seldom engage in farming but rather in certain occupations which in some areas they virtually monopolize: keeping inns and organizaing caravans, butchering, leather working, metal-work, or managing shops which deal in curios and jewelry. Because of oppression and a strong sense of religious community, they tend to live in special districts or streets. They have been more inclined towards athletics and military careers than the Chinese.[43]

779 794 563 The Moslem sector of a city or the Moslem village community centers on its mosque presided over by its Iman, usually elected from among senior leaders; the Imam and the elders invite an Ahung who preaches, settles disputes,

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43. Chan, op. cit., p. 6; Encyclopedia of China Problems, pp. 421-22.

779 563 794 interprets Islamic law, and presides at ceremonies.[44] The Ahung is usually versed in Arabic, although until very recently few had any direct contact with major centers of Islam in the Near East.

779 563 In the Southwest China, Mohammedan communities are found in all provinces, but by far the highest concentration is in the province of Yunnan where tension and conflict between Han-Chinese and the Moslems has been endemic in modern times. The following table indicates the provincial distribution of believers and religious establishments (probably places of worship rather than Islamic schools or any such institutions) throughout the region as of 1938.[45] Population estimates for the same period are added to suggest the proportion of Moslems in the total population. The source of the Moslem figures gives the total number of Moslems in China as more than 48,000,000, a figure that some scholars regard as far too high.[46]

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44. Chan, op. cit., p. 189; Encyclopedia of China Problems.

45. Chung-kuo Nien-chien [Chinese Yearbook], 1948, pp. 126-27.

46. Cf. the admirable summary of the statistical argument in Chan, op. cit., pp. 187-88. Chan, p. 188, note 12, cites the leading Chinese Mohammaden scholar Pai-Shou-i's estimate of between 30 and 40 million Moslems in China. The picture publication Chinese Moslems, Peking, the Foreign Languages Press, 1955, gives the figure 10 million.

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Province	Pop. in Millions	Moslems	Mosques
Szechwan	48.	2,615,330	2,279
Yunnan	15.	4,567,290	3,971
Kweichow	14.3	519,160	449

779 668

Islam in modern times has manifested some of the tendencies which Buddhism showed under the impact of various modernizing forces. One of these was the tendency for lay leaders to rise in influence over the Ahung. Another was the foundation of a Chinese Islamic Association in 1912 to represent the interests of all Chinese Moslems, to work for social reform, and to foster closer relations between Moslems and non-Moslems. It claimed 3,000 branches by 1923. Its successors participated in the resistance against Japan, sponsored students abroad and the importation of modern scholars of the Koran from other countries, and developed young men's associations and medical services.[47] The total effect of this activity was to foster a trend to liberality and modernity. It served also to identify the Chinese Moslems with the national aspirations of other Chinese.

47. Cf. Chan op. cit., pp. 190-91.

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779 795 As the Chinese Moslems came out of isolation and into contact with the rest of Islam and with modern culture generally, there was a considerable difference of view as to the perpetuation of Islam in China. Visits to Mecca in the 1780's had impressed some Chinese Moslems with how far, in their long isolation, they had diverged from orthodox practices. This experience led to the foundation of the New Sect, which stressed return to pure and orthodox Islamic practices. They were resisted by the Old Sect, which favored holding to the customary ways developed in China through the centuries. A new New Sect (Tsan-hsin chiao) was founded by Ma Fu-ch'u (1794-1874) of Yunnan Province, and this sect, emphasizing religious ethics, the spirit rather than the letter of scripture, and modernism in dress, has recently been strong along the coast of China and has spread to modern cultural centers.[48]

779 563 873 Chinese Mohammedans, in their moves towards modernism, came to accept the Chinese translation of the Koran, hitherto only in the sacred language of Arabic. They had, by 1936, opened eleven high schools for Moslem children, and they began to send students abroad to foreign centers of Islamic learning. Yunnan

48. Ibid., pp. 192-94.

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779 Province led in this movement; in 1937,
563 eighteen Chinese students were sent to Egypt,
873 and half of these were from Yunnan. By 1930, the Islamic Theological College attached to the Chungking mosque had been in operation five years, and the Chinese Islamic Association had set up or co-ordinated two hundred primary schools and twenty high schools.[49] Yet the spread of modern type education was handicapped by the poverty of the Moslem communities and by religious prejudice against Chinese learning. For example Shantien, in Yunnan, was the outstanding Islamic cultural center in China and sent more students abroad than any other town; yet in 1949 it had a population of only 5,000, of which two were college graduates and "some thirty" high school graduates; it had one grade school with 360 students but no high school.[50]

779 What have been Chinese Communist policies
668 toward the problem of Chinese Islam, a problem that involves some areas where they are a major segment of the population and other areas where they represent a cohesive, slowly modernizing religious community? (The

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49. Ibid., pp. 198-201.
50. Ibid., p. 200.

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668 policies adopted towards major centers of Moslem population, are dealt with in the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Communist religious policies toward Mohammedanism have something in common with Communist policies toward other religions. The standard pattern of organization has been established by the Peking government: An All-China Islamic Association which, it should be emphasized, differs from former organizations in being an instrument of control over Chinese Mohammedans operated by a hierarchy ideologically acceptable to the Communists. A Peking propaganda booklet issued in 1955 states that, "The work of education is really tackled seriously now, and the number of primary and secondary school pupils is now double the figure before liberation.[51] This may sound like "progress," but what it undoubtedly means is that the children of Chinese Moslems are increasingly being given the prescribed Communist education.

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51. Chinese Moslems. A NCNA dispatch dated June 9, 1955, states that Moslem students in Shanghai have increased from 290 in 1949 to 3,000. Government subsidies (and control) might account for this. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

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668 The cadre is the basic instrument for the Communization of Chinese Islam. Offering the education and prestige inducements of Party work has apparently successfully recruited cadres from among young Chinese Moslems. "In the government organs there have been many Moslem cadres. Some of them have taken up the leadership jobs. In the areas where the Moslems have been comparatively concentrated, the government has paid attention to foster the basic-level Moslem cadres."[52]

The policy of Communization is well reflected in a speech of Ma Sung-t'ing, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Moslem Cultural Association, on the occasion of the "Second Enlarged Conference" in June 1955. This conference, he said,

> "...will study how to help the government to carry out the ideological education in patriotism, national unity, and Socialist transformation among the Moslems, so as to further strengthen and consolidate national unity and continue to develop and raise the Moslem political, economic, and cultural levels in jointly carrying out the construction of the fatherland."[53]

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52. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

53. NCNA dispatch, SCMP, 1067, June 11-13, 1955, p. 24.

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779 668 The Chinese Communists' policy towards the Moslems has been affected by two factors which do not influence their policies towards other religions: (1) the Russian pattern of handling integrated minority groups through various types of "culturally autonomous" organizations; (2) Chinese ambitions in Islamic areas of Asia which foster tactical tolerance towards the Islamic minority in China. Thus the glamorized picture publication Chinese Moslems has texts in English, Chinese, Arabic, and Indonesian, and its introduction ends with the greeting "Salaam to all peace-loving Moslems."[54] Selections from the works of Mao Tse-tung have been translated into Arabic for the indoctrination of the Ahungs who do not read Chinese; probably these translations will be used in Indonesia and other countries where Arabic is a sacred lingua-franca. Mosques in "show" cities such as Canton, Shanghai, and Peking have been renovated and serve to demonstrate to Moslem visitors the "reality" of Communist China's promise of religious freedom.

779 563 We have little detailed and reliable information on the Islamic communities of the

54. Chinese Moslems, introduction.

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779 563 Southwest today. But some trends should be noted. The education of Islamic youth, although special Moslem schools have been set up by the government, will be in the pattern ordained by the goverment, and the youth will tend in time to become more Communist than Moslem.[55] Secondly, the break-up of the closely knit communities in the Southwest will probably 779 563 proceed apace. The Communist government boasts of the increasing number of Moslem youth 197 now classified as "workers";[56] this means integration of the youth into new state-ordained patterns of activity in factories and workers organizations; it means that they will slowly be alienated from their parents' values as well as from their parents' occupational roles. Thirdly, as Moslems increasingly share in government and social activities, there will be less inclination on their part towards a defensive separatism; it is claimed, for example that 72 Moslems have been deputies to Shanghai municipal and chü congresses, and token participation tends to bring them into new orbits of activity.[57] Among the 29,000

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55. A NCNA dispatch of June 9, 1955 states that there are five primary and one middle school for Moslems in Shanghai and that 90 per cent of the students have received free or reduced tuition.

56. NCNA, Peking, June 10, 1955; SCMP, 1067, p. 23.

57. Ibid.

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779 Moslems in Shanghai, measures have allegedly
563 been taken to provide for their special
177 religious dietary needs,[58] and there are references to special food shipments for Ramadan. Such measures would tend to reduce initial suspicion and resistance among the Moslems and, in the long run, to make integration easier. The processes of Communization, secularization, and integration will probably advance less rapidly in a strongly Moslem province such as Yunnan than in the provinces of North China and the Yangtze valley. The measures we have noted plus the activity of the Moslem cadre, backed by the full force and apparatus of Communist government, will ultimately do more to reduce the age-old separatism and resistance of Islam than the measures of earlier Chinese governments.

V. CATHOLICISM

779 The older of the two Christian faiths in
797 China has had 350 years of missionary and organizational experience. It is, in China as elsewhere, resourceful, flexible, and highly disciplined. In modern China, Catholicism has repeatedly come under nationalistic attack

58. Ibid.

779 because of its foreign support and its allegiance
797 to Rome. The church has countered these attacks in a variety of ways: it has encouraged the Sinicization of Church symbols, e.g., the Virgin is portrayed as a Chinese woman in Chinese dress; it has given its foreign missionaries a more thorough grounding in Chinese language and culture, so that the best of them, wearing Chinese scholars' gowns as habits, speaking excellent Chinese, can make their way successfully in any stratum of Chinese society. The
793 most striking response to nationalistic attacks has been the increasing use of Chinese priests throughout the hierarchy. This is part of worldwide policies in any age of rising nationalism. The following figures indicate the dimensions of the change since 1900:[59]

	Chinese Catholics	Foreign Priests	Native Priests
1900	700,000	1,375	471
1948	3,275,000	3,015	2,676

59. Jean Monsterleet, S.J., Les Martyrs de Chine parlent: L'Empire de Mao Tse-tung contre l'Eglise duChrist, Paris, 1953, p. 32; hereinafter cited as Monsterleet.

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797 The situation in 1945-46 was encouraging to Chinese and foreign Catholics. The clergy was being rapidly Sinicized, charitable work was going forward, Catholic educational institutions were full. Native and foreign clergy had gained approval for their work in the war of resistance against Japan. At the same time there were developments which, especially in the light of later events, promised trouble to the Church. The exchange of [648] envoys between the Vatican and the Nationalist Government took place in 1946; that Bishop Paul Yu-pin was widely believed to have strong influence with the Nationalist Government, boded ill for the Church when the government declined in power. As the Communist power increased, 668 the persecution of the Church, begun in Com- 798 munist area in 1937, was a grim warning of 797 what might be in store for Chinese Catholicism 779 as a whole.[61] Catholic Action, the association of enthusiastic laymen for the advancement of the Faith, had been growing in all parts of the country from 1928 onward; there were

61. Cf. Raymonde de Jaegher and I. Corbally Kuhn, Tempête sur la Chine, Paris, 1953.

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668 two-hundred adult groups and thirty youth
798 groups as early as 1930.[62] In 1948 the Papal
797 Nuncio ordered the formation of the Legion
779 of Mary, a more militant, zealous, and disciplined organization of Catholic laymen, which in many areas absorbed the Catholic Action groups. The new organization was set up by an American priest, and it had the Chinese name of Sheng-mu chün, Army, or Legion, of Mary. Many experienced Catholic missionarie were doubtful if any strong Chinese government would tolerate this type of militant organization. The group has proved of major propaganda value to the Communists and an object of their most ruthless measures of oppression.[63]

798 Communist policies and propaganda have
797 made the most of all the vulnerabilities of the
779 Chinese Catholic Church. Its foreign "imperialist" and Kuomintang connections were played

62. Monsterleet, p. 148. It seems to have had much less strength in the Southwest than in the major cultural and commercial centers. Cf. Monsterleet, pp. 32-33.

63. Cf., Hsü, Hsin-Chung-kuo ti tsung-chiao ko-hsin yü-tung [The Movement for Religious Reformation in New China], Shanghai, 1951, pp. 9-13. Hereafter cited as Hsü.

798 up, and nationalistic feelings against it were
797 aroused. Its role as property owner --
779 "foreign capitalist-imperialist oppression" --
was dramatized during the land reform period,
and local ignorance and hatred turned against
it.[64] Old and long discredited accusations were
made against Catholic charitable organizations:
the Sacred Heart Home for Children in Nanking
was labeled a "little Buchenwald" and the
sisters were accused of torturing, neglecting,
and selling Chinese children.[65] The war in
Korea provided the occasion for an increasing
number of accusations of espionage against
Catholic clergy.

Communist government measures have been many, but the main steps resemble those taken against other religious groups. The 1950 campaign for "triple independence" or "triple autonomy" involved freedom from foreign administration, financing, and evangelistic policy control. This was given emotional significance by the warfare in Korea, with the Communists' well-managed propaganda campaigns against imperialism and

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64. Cf. the dramatic eyewitness account of F. Legrand, Le Communisme arrive au village Chinois, Peking, 1947. This observation was made before the nationwide land reform campaign.

65. Cf. Walker, China Under Communism, [see following page]

espionage.[66]

In 1951 the campaign against the Church was accelerated. All Catholic schools and universities and many hospitals and churches were confiscated. Priests were "tried" and imprisoned, and the Papal Nuncio was expelled from China.[67]

The next step in the campaign against Catholicism resembled the policy followed in Russia and in the East European satellites. This was the foundation by the Communists of a "national church" whose guiding spirits were a small minority of disaffected clergy and laymen. This group was constituted as the "Committee of the Reform Church." It was not subject to episcopal or pontifical directives. The group was to decide what was to be taught, who could say mass or give the sacraments; and it advocated "progressive," i.e., orthodox Communist teaching. Under its sponsorship certain "model parishes" were set up with "progressive" priests in charge.

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65. (continued) p. 190. Such accusations recall the stories circulated by the gentry which touched off the Tientsin massacre of Chinese Catholics and foreigners in 1870.

66. Monsterleet, pp. 25-29.

67. Ibid., p. 28.

Apparently this organization has had only limited success. Monsterleet estimates that only 2 per cent went over to the "reform church"; many openly proclaim their faith; some died as martyrs.[68]

From October 1952 on there was less persecution of Catholics, although between January 1951 and November 1953 the number of missionaries was reduced through expulsion from 3,222 to 364.[69]

Catholic missionary and organizational work came rather late to the Southwest, and this area has not been served by any of the great missionary orders that have had a long-term impact on areas in north and central China. Few if any of the dioceses were under Chinese bishops, and the two provinces of Kiangsi and Kweichow together had fewer Catholic clergy than the diocese of Peking alone.[70] Another index of the relative weakness of Catholicism in the southwest is the number of Catholic periodicals in the area; as of 1938 the three provinces

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68. Monsterleet, p. 29. It should be emphasized that these figures are given by a Catholic author.

69. Mission Bulletin, April 1952, p. 323, and Jan. 1954, p. 56; cited in Walker, op. cit. p. 189.

70. Monsterleet, pp. 32-33.

1:Stanford U, S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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798 nor death. I saw shy youths changed
797 into courageous apostles; I saw the ambitious and selfish give up their goals and possessions; I saw some of my Christian youth break the bonds of family and friendship for this Cause."[77]

The basic question is whether the harrassed and persecuted Church can find the means to give its own youth these qualities. If it can not, its future throughout China is dark indeed.

VI. PROTESTANTISM

177 In many respects the Protestant
•779 missionaries and their converts set the
797 pattern for the modernizing movements which took place in Buddhism and Islam. Protestant religious work in the twentieth century came to be accompanied by wide-spread, diverse, and large-scale social service, medical, and educational activities. The Protestant missionaries helped to awaken the social conscience of the Chinese, and the missions were major centers for the dissemination of general knowledge about the West. Sun Yat-sen was a devout Christian, and Christian thought left its mark on much of his work. As pioneers

77. Robert W. Greene, Calvary in China, New York, 1953, pp. 76-77.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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in medical education, in many fields of technical education, in women's education, and in many other spheres, the Protestants made striking contributions to the dissolution of the traditional order in China. But it was beyond their powers to replace that order with a Christian democratic society. And they failed also to forge an effective instrument to work for that end: a disciplined, independent, vigorous body of Chinese Protestants.

Protestant missions began in the ports of the China coast that were gradually opened up after China's successive defeats by the Western powers. The rights of residence, travel, and property ownership for both Catholic and Protestant churches were exacted in the successive treaties which China was forced to sign. This background of, as it were, forced entry into China has handicapped Christianity in China in two important respects: as the tide of nationalistic sentiment rose, anti-Christian movements invariably accompanied anti-foreign and nationalistic manifestations. Secondly, the decades of foreign protection and foreign support prevented the Christian churches -- the Protestant perhaps more than the Catholic -- from developing their own means of self-support and their own mechanisms of survival in times of political upheaval.

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Protestantism has suffered from its own sectarianism. A rational division of Christian effort was usually impossible when Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians and innumerable small sects were at odds with one another and brought diverse and conflicting interpretations of Christianity to the Chinese.[78]

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78. There were 66 different Protestant missionary societies in China in 1906. By 1919 there were 130 different societies, groups, and other missionary organizations. Cf. Pr. Damboriena, "Les Missions Protestantes en Chine" Bulletin de l'Université l'Aurore, Ser. III. Vol. 8, No. 1, Shanghai, 1947, p. 18; hereinafter cited as Damboriena; Creighton Lacy, "The Missionary Exodus from China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, Dec. 1955, p. 305, observes: "Far more disruptive in almost every mission area has been the swarm of small, independent sects -- pentecostal, holiness, fundamentalist -- most of them divisive. Not only do they assert their unwillingness to co-operate with other Christian groups, but they seek most of their converts from the established churches."

1:Stanford U. S-4,, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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797 779 Naturally the antagonism between Catholic and Protestant mission workers -- their tendency to depreciate one another when dealing with the Chinese -- further weakened the whole effort. Martin Yang describes the antagonisms that developed in the Shantung countryside between Catholic and Protestant Chinese; this added to the tension that already existed between the mass of the villagers and the converts to both forms of Christianity.[79] Yang, himself a Christian, has this to say of the motivations of conversion in the village he studied: "The first converts were members of the Ch'en and Yang families and included a Ch'en scholar and his second brother. They were all ambitious men, and their primary purpose in conversion was to get positions as country preachers, and then to establish a church-subsidized village school, to use foreign influence through the church to deal with their opponents, and to sell food to the missionaries."[80] Chinese governments, imperial and nationalist, found the Christians troublesome, and, in the twenties and thirties there were serious efforts to curb them. One of the effects of government sanctions, combined with the relatively poor

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79. Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, New York, 1945, pp. 158-64.

80. Ibid., p. 159.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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results after ninety years of effort, was to reduce the enthusiasm for China missions among Christians abroad. This was reflected in the decreased flow of funds, notably from the United States. From nearly $6,000,000 in 1928, Protestant contributions fell to a little over $3,500,000 in 1933 and did not greatly exceed $4,000,000 in 1935 and 1936.[81] This handicapped nearly all fields of missionary endeavor.

Another arena in which the Protestants tried for influence was the great polemical struggle of the 1920's and 1930's over the nature and future of Chinese civilization. In this prolonged and important controversy, the Protestants found themselves handicapped by the divisions among themselves, notably that between modernists and fundamentalists, and also by the rising tide of nationalism. In the end the Protestants shared with idealistic Chinese and Western philosophers the failure to stem the rising tide of materialism in thought.

The Sino-Japanese War and the war in the Pacific disrupted missionary efforts in north and central China. At the war's end, the

81. Damobriena, p. 83.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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797 Protestant missionaries returned and set
779 about the rehabilitation of church establishments. Apparently progress was made, but there were disquieting aspects. The interdenominational unions which the Japanese had imposed during their occupation broke apart and sectarian rivalries sprang up again.

> "The measure of self support achieved in wartime necessity collapsed before the inflowing torrent of foreign funds. Leadership which had demonstrated both courage and competence through years of crisis politely yield to colleagues returning from the West."[82]

American financial support also drew upon the Protestants an increasing barrage of Communist and left-wing criticism as the Nationalist Government -- receiving American support -- became increasingly discredited. Protestants, because of their preponderant emphasis on the social gospel (serving God through service to society) and their less formidable unity and discipline, suffered less in Communist-occupied areas than did the Catholics. Yet the more clear-headed of the Protestants could not but dread the rise of Communist power.

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82. Lacy, op. cit., p. 306.

2: Rock K-5 (1934-) 1947 AF16 Southwest China AF16

CHAPTER III

Lamaseries and Buddhist Temples of Li-chiang

1. The Karma-pa Sect and its Hierarchs

The Karma-pa, a sub-sect of the Kargyu-pa, founded about the middle of the twelfth century, look upon rDo-rje hChhang as their supreme deity. He is regarded as a reflex of Buddha himself. He is the metamorphosis of Indra and is called Vajradhara in Sanskrit. Directly inspired by rDo-rje hChhang was Ti-lo-pa (Tai-lo-pa), who had Nā-ro-pa as disciple. Thence followed Mar-pa, who was the teacher of the famous Mi-la (Mi-la-ras-pa, pronounced Mi-la-re-pa), the Cotton-clad. Mar-pa was born in 1010 (Bacot in *La Vie de Marpa*, p. 2, n. 1, gives 993 as the year of his birth and 1081 as that of his death); Mi-la-re-pa was born in 1038 and died in 1122.

His disciple was Dwags-po. This latter's disciple was Dus-gsum mKhyen-pa who became the actual founder of the Karma-pa sect. He was born in 1109 and died in 1192.

There have been 15 incarnations, including the present one, of Dus-gsum mKhyen-pa (pronounced Dü-sum khyen-pa).

Dus-gsum mKhyen-pa's disciple was hGro-mgon Ras-chhen; the latter's disciple was sPun-brag-pa.

The first incarnation but second head of the Karma-pa sect was Karma-pa-zhi (1203–1282); he was invited by Kublai Khan to China. His disciple was mKhas-grub U-rgyan-pa (the abbot writes A-rgyan-pa.)

The second incarnation was Rang-byung rDo-rje (1283–1338); he was the third head of the Karma-pa Church. He was invited to Peking by the Emperor Tohan Timur, Shun Ti 順帝, or Hui Tsung 惠宗 (1333–1367). The third incarnation was Rol-pai rDo-rje (1339–1382); he was the fourth head; the fifth head (fourth incarnation) was De-bzhin-gshegs-pa (1383–1415); in the abbot's list he is called De-bzhin-shes-pa; he was invited to China by the Ming Emperor Ch'eng Tsu 成祖 (Yung-lo 1403–1424); the sixth head was mTshong-wa Don-ldan; the seventh head Chhos-grags-rGya-mtsho; the eighth Rang-byung mTsho-skyes; the ninth Mi-bskyod rDo-rje; the tenth Chhos dbyings rDo-rje; the eleventh Ye-shes rDo-rje; the twelfth Byang-chhub rDo-rje; the thirteenth bDun-bdul rDo-rje; the fourteenth Theg-mchhog rDo-rje and the fifteenth mKhah-khyab rDo-rje.

The sixteenth head but fifteenth incarnation of Dü-sum Khyen-pa was found nearly a decade ago. His name is Rod-pas rDo-rje[1] pronounced Rö-pe-dor-je.

[p. 201]

3: Hutson M-5 (no date) 1921 AF16 Southwest China AF16

778 ancestors to follow him. Everything pertaining to idolatry
769 may be given up easily, but ancestor worship only with great difficulty. Some have pretended to be without a family altar, while they have still been continuing the worship in a secluded part of the house. This is the kernel of the religion of the Chinese; fear of the displeasure of departed ancestors is very real, and no expense is spared to make their spirits rest in peace.

778 The idea of transmigration or rather rotation of souls
775 seems to be found in this altar, and the *tzŭ p'ai* 子派 of the family bears this out. Most families use only sixteen names; but some have thirty-two and a few have twenty-four; when these have run their course the round begins afresh, and the spirits of ancestors are probably supposed to do the same.

The furniture in the chief room in the house does not belong to any individual member of the family, but is attached to the family altar and is family property.

778 A tablet to three classes of religions is not uncommon,
779 and in some homes it takes the place of the Heaven and Earth tablet. It includes (1) 上三教 *shang san chiao*, the upper three religions, viz.—Confucius 儒教孔聖 *ju chiao K'ung shêng*; the Taoist Sage 道教老君 *tao chiao Lao chün*; Buddha, 釋教牟尼 *Shih chiao mu ni*. (2) *Chung* 中 *san chiao*, the middle three religions: the god of Literature 文昌帝君 Wên Ch'ang ti chün; the god of War 銀關大帝 Yin ch'üeh ta ti; the god of dark Heaven 玄天上帝 hsüan t'ien shang ti. (3) *Hsia* 下 *san chiao*, the lower three religions: the god of Medicine 藥王菩薩 Yo wang p'u sa; the goddess of Mercy 觀音大士 Kuan Yin ta shih; the god of cattle Niu 牛 wang p'u sa.

On this tablet there is also written 歷代昭穆 *li tai chao mu*, to the ancestors far and near.

At the outer left hand side of the door as one enters a house may be seen an idol or tablet to the Taoist trinity, 三品三元三官大帝 *san p'in san yüan san kuan ta ti*. The worshipper bows to the outside as he is supposed to be worshipping heaven. The idol is generally a painting about a foot square.

5: Davies G-5 (1894-1900) 1909 AF16 Southwest China AF16

276 and for this purpose keeps in his house a taper constantly smouldering. To blow this taper into a flame is quite an art. It requires a short quick puff, stopping very suddenly, and the European unused to such a thing finds considerable difficulty in managing it.

000 We camped at Hsiao-ch'in, which lies near the mouth of the side valley which we wished to explore. Here at last I found P'u-mans who knew their own language, and I took down a vocabulary from them[1]. It resembles the La and Wa languages, and I have little doubt that they are connected with these tribes, especially as they here call themselves Wa-la. P'u-man is only a name given to them by Shans and Chinamen.

Leaving our camp standing at Hsiao-ch'in, we started the next morning to explore the side valley which runs down from the high range to the east. In a few miles the view of the steep hills at the top of the range convinced us that this was no good for a railway, and that the route Watts-Jones had surveyed up the Kung-lang valley was the only likely way to get up out of the Mekong.

•779 Our day was not, however, without interest, as we discovered that there are a good many Panthay villages in this out-of-the-way spot. On our way back we went in and had tea with the head-man of one of these. He told us that they had lived here for 16 or 17 generations, so if that is true they may be the descendants of some of Kublai Khan's soldiers. I asked them if they had korans in Arabic, and they at once produced one. The head-man said he could read it, but did not seem very anxious to give us a specimen of his Arabic scholarship. We thought it more polite not to press him, as he would have found it rather difficult to "save his face," if it turned out that he could not read a word.

000 We slept at Hsiao-ch'in again, and in the middle of the night were waked up by loud yells. It appears that one of the mule men had heard someone moving about on the hillside, and that when he shouted to know who it was, the man ran away. No doubt he was looking about to see what he could pick up, but he had not succeeded, as

[1] See vocabularies in pocket of cover.